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4LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
those congressional goals.8 ' As advocated in Allen" the Court should
emphasize goals rather than means, since "implying a cause of ac-
tion may increase the likelihood of compliance with the statute by
giving victims incentive to assist in its enforcement and potential
violators, faced with an additional penalty, added reason to conform
their conduct to it.
83
Walter Joseph Hryszko
LOUISIANA'S PRESUMPTION OF PATERNITY:
THE BASTARDIZED ISSUE
A concursus proceeding was brought by Tenneco Oil Company
to determine the ownership of oil and gas royalties owed under cer-
tain mineral leases. The trial court ruled that the Houstons,
possessors of the property, were entitled to payment of the
royalties in dispute. The Second Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed,'
interpreting article 3654(1) of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure'
81. See Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. at 556-57; J. I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. at 432-33. If Congress had explicitly indicated in the legislation that
the courts were to determine the means of effectuating the goals established by the
legislative branch, then the Court's implication of a private cause of action would not
violate the doctrine of separation of powers. In fact, if Congress did leave this duty to
the courts, the separation of powers doctrine would be violated if the courts were to
shirk this responsibility. If the courts do err and imply a private cause of action when
none was intended by the enactment, Congress may overrule the courts by denying
the existence of such an implied action. Congress may also prevent judicial inter-
ference of an enforcement scheme by expressly denying private actions in the statute.
49 U.S.C. § 5(11) (1976) (remedies conferred by statute are exclusive, Interstate Com-
merce Act, part I).
82. 393 U.S. at 556-57. See notes 30-31, supra and accompanying text.
83. Note, supra note 2, at 291.
1. Tenneco Oil Co. v. Houston, 364 So. 2d 1056 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978).
2. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 3654 provides:
When the issue of ownership of immovable property or of a real right is
presented in an action for a declaratory judgment, or in a concursus, expropria-
tion, or similar proceeding, or the issue of the ownership of funds deposited in the
registry of the court and which belong to the owner of the immovable property or
of the real right is so presented, the court shall render judgment in favor of the
party:
(1) Who would be entitled to the possession of the immovable property or real
right in a possessory action, unless the adverse party makes out his title thereto;
or
(2) Who proves better title to the immovable property or real right, when
neither party would be entitled to the possession of the immovable property or
real right in a possessory action.
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to require the party out of possession in a petitory action to prove
title good against the world, not merely better title under a common
author. The supreme court affirmed this result but used a different
rationale, declining to comment on the correctness of the lower
court's interpretation of article 3654(1). Instead, the court held that
the Harps, the parties out of possession, could make out no title
whatsoever because they were illegitimate and, therefore, did not
share a common author with the Houstons. Tenneco Oil Co. v.
Houston, 372 So. 2d 1194 (La. 1979).'
Many rights and obligations established by the Civil Code are
dependent on the parent-child relation;5 thus, the process for deter-
mining that relation is an important one. It has been suggested that
the Code creates this legal relationship through a two-step process
involving filiation and classification! Filiation is the means by which
a child is recognized as the issue of a given set of parents.7 It
establishes from whom the child derives certain rights and to whom
the child owes specific obligations. The cornerstone of this process is
3. The court of appeal relied on Pure Oil Co. v. Skinner, 294 So. 2d 797 (La.
1974), which held that proof of a more ancient title under a common author only
establishes better title and does not satisfy Code of Civil Procedure article 3654(1).
4. One writer suggests that the significance of Tenneco will arise from its deter-
mination of the property issue. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1978-1979 Term-Persons, 40 LA. L. REV. 543, 552-53 (1980). It is possible that the deci-
sion will have little impact in this area. The supreme court did not discuss whether
tracing title to a common author will defeat an adverse claim. In his dissent, Justice
Tate stressed that Pure Oil Co. v. Skinner, 294 So. 2d 797 (La. 1974), is an aberration
in our jurisprudence and that tracing title to a common author destroys the title of
another party claiming under that author. He reached this conclusion by reasoning
that the Harps were legitimate and therefore heirs of the common author. 372 So. 2d
at 1196-97 (Tate, J., dissenting). The majority rendered the question moot when it
determined that the Harps were illegitimate. Since the court did not even provide dic-
ta on this issue of property law, it will not be discussed in detail in this casenote.
Recent Civil Code revision may help resolve the question of what a party out of
possession must prove to make out his title against a possessor. LA. CIv. CODE art. 531,
as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No. 180, provides: "One who claims ownership of an im-
movable against another in possession must prove he has acquired ownership from a
previous owner or by acquisitive prescription. If neither party is in possession, he need
only prove a better title." LA. CIv. CODE art. 532, as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No.
180, states that "when the titles of the parties are traced to a common author, he is
presumed to be the previous owner."
5. See, e.g., LA. CIv. CODE arts. 215-45, 887, 902, 918-29 & 2317-18.
6. Spaht & Shaw, The Strongest Presumption Challenged: Speculations on War-
ren v. Richard and Succession of Mitchell, 37 LA. L. REV. 59 (1976).
7. Louisiana Civil Code article 119 requires mutual fidelity of the spouses. This
obligation implies that the husband and wife will share their sexual potential with each
other and refrain from sharing their sexual potential with anyone else. Monogamy
helps insure that the husband is the person responsible for conception. See Spaht &
Shaw, supra note 6, at 66.
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Civil Code article 184 which provides that "the husband of the
mother is presumed to be the father of all children born or con-
ceived during the marriage." From a careful comparison of Civil
Code articles 184 and 119,8 it is evident that legal and biological
paternity are intended to coincide. By assuming that the spouses
will share their sexual potential exclusively with each other, it
naturally follows that any children born during the union will be the
husband's issue.
Application of the presumption in article 184 has significant ef-
fects. The child is spared the tedious process required to establish in
law what probably exists in fact.' Historically, absolute proof of
biological paternity has been virtually impossible. Even those most
knowledgeable in medicine could make only an educated guess as to
biological paternity by determining access to the mother based on
probable time of conception." In view of the lack of reliable scien-
tific data, the redactors of the Code created a legal process for
determining filiation." Thus, the presumption of paternity estab-
lished an effective legal solution to the difficult task of proving
biological fatherhood."
Use of the presumption also increases the number of children
deemed legitimate, thereby reflecting a strong societal interest in
promoting whole, stable families based on legitimate family ties.
This preference for legitimacy is evident from the restricted nature
8. Although filiation is also used to establish the relationship between the child
and the mother, maternity is rarely at issue since the identity of the mother is rarely
in doubt. For purposes of this discussion, filiation is referred to as the legal process by
which a child is linked with a father.
9. The Civil Code provides a means for proving filiation when it is not presumed.
See, e.g., LA. CIv. CODE arts. 194-97 & 202-12. These articles illustrate that the process
of proving paternity is greatly facilitated by the application of the legal presumption in
article 184.
10. 1 T. BECK, ELEMENTS OF MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 591-617 (11th ed. 1860).
11. Although the legislature amended articles 184-90 in 1976, see 1976 La. Acts,
No. 430, the presumption has been a part of the Code since its inception. See LA. CIv.
CODE arts. 203-08 (1825).
12. Modern technology has now made it possible to determine who is not the
father of a given child through the use of blood grouping tests. Louisiana recognized
the validity of these tests in Act 521 of 1972, commonly known as the Uniform Act on
Blood Tests to Determine Paternity. LA. R.S. 9:396-98, added by 1972 La. Acts, No.
521, §1.
Recent technological advances have now made possible positive identification of the
father; however, these innovative procedures are not yet widely available because of
their novelty. See, e.g., Beautyman, Paternity Actions-A Matter of Opinion-or the
Trial of the Blood?, 1976 LEGAL MED. ANN. 239, 243; Shaw & Kass, Illegitimacy, Child
Support and Paternity Testing, 13 Hous. L. REV. 41 (1975); Teraski, Resolution by




of the disavowal action,"3 which provides a remedy to the husband
who seeks to disclaim responsibility for children who are not his.
The right to disavow is limited in that only the husband, and in
some instances his heirs or legatees, may bring the action." Since
the right to disclaim paternity is reserved to the person best able to
know that he, the husband of the mother, is not the father-thereby
reducing unwarranted attacks on the paternity of legitimate
children15- the stability of the family is preserved. In addition, the
husband is protected from deprivation of the parenthood of children
he wishes to claim as his own. The father, as well as the child,
benefits from the bonds of legitimacy. The husband may consider
that the burden of the legal responsibilities of parenthood is far
outweighed by the advantages resulting from the custody and com-
panionship of his children. The personal nature of the disavowal ac-
tion insures that a vengeful mother or perhaps others motivated by
greed cannot deny the husband these advantages.
The limited nature of the disavowal action,'6 as construed by the
jurisprudence, has made the presumption of paternity so difficult to
rebut that it has been called "the strongest presumption known in
the law."1 7 The presumption's reputation for being virtually irrebut-
table is well deserved. Narrow judicial construction of the disavowal
provisions in the Code has frequently prevented a husband from
rightfully disclaiming paternity in situations in which simple logic
dictates that the legal father could not have been the biological
father. 8 Such an approach is consistent, however, with a marked
13. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 184-90, as amended by 1976 La. Acts, No. 430. The
amendments allow a less restrictive action than that formerly provided in articles
184-92; however, an action to disavow paternity still requires a high burden of proof.
14. LA. CIv. CODE art. 190.
15. See 1 M. PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATIES pt. 1, no. 1422, at 781 (12th ed. La. St.
L. Inst. trans. 1959).
16. The restricted nature of this action is also evident in the relatively short
prescriptive period applicable to the disavowal action. The husband has 180 days from
the time he learns of the birth to institute the disavowal action; however, if he is
unable to bring suit, the period lasts the duration of his inability. LA. CIV. CODE art.
189, as amended by 1976 La. Acts, No. 430. Prior to the 1976 revision of the paternity
articles, the action had to be brought "within one month, if he be in the place where
the child is born, or within two months after his return, if he be absent at that time."
LA. Cxv. CODE art. 191 (as it appeared prior to 1976 La. Acts, No. 430).
The prescriptive period allowed to the husband's heirs extends for one year from
the birth or one year from the husband's death, whichever is longer. LA. CIV. CODE art.
190, as amended by 1976 La. Acts, No. 430.
17. Feazel v. Feazel, 222 La. 113, 117, 62 So. 2d 119, 120 (1952).
18. See, e.g., Tannehill v. Tannehill, 261 La. 933, 261 So. 2d 619 (1972); Williams v.
Williams, 230 La. 1, 87 So. 2d 707 (1956); Feazel v. Feazel, 222 La. 113, 62 So. 2d 119
(1952); Succession of Saloy, 44 La. 433, 10 So. 872 (1892); Lewis v. Powell, 178 So. 2d
769 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965); Burrell v. Burrell, 154 So. 2d 103 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
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tendency in the jurisprudence to protect the child who is caught in
the center of a paternity dispute. The supreme court stated in
Williams v. Williams: 5
It has always been the policy of the Louisiana law to protect
innocent children, born during marriage, against scandalous at-
tacks upon their paternity by the husband of the mother, who
may be seeking to avoid his obligations, or by third persons
unscrupulously claiming the estate of the husband after death.2"
The reluctance of the courts to allow disavowal in all but the most
extreme situations has been criticized as being unduly prejudicial to
the husband." No doubt, this injustice prompted the legislature to
amend Civil Code articles 184-90 in 1976.22 Although there are only a
few cases construing these new provisions,23 the courts seem to
recognize that the amendments are designed to strike a better
balance between a policy favoring a finding of legitimacy and the
need to prevent a husband from being unjustly burdened with pater-
nity.
Once the link between father and child has been established, the
classification process is used to determine what rights and obliga-
tions will flow from the relation created through filiation. The Code
categorizes children into two classes: legitimate and illegitimate.2" Il-
legitimacy still carries at least some social stigma, and the il-
legitimate child is denied many benefits legitimate children
receive.25 Accordingly, the courts, in assigning a classification, at-
19. 230 La. 1, 87 So. 2d 707 (1956).
20. Id. at 7-8, 87 So. 2d at 709.
21. See, e.g., Pascal, Who is the Papa?, 18 LA. L. REV. 685, 687-88 (1958) ("For over
a century the unwillingness to label a child an illegitimate has led to decisions which
imposed . . . [legitimacy] on children . . . in situations in which no geneticist or layman
would even suspect him [the husband] of fatherhood in fact.").
22. 1976 La. Acts, No. 430. One feature of the more recent legislation is that a
husband who wishes to disavow has a wider scope of evidence at his disposal. Since
scientific methods for determining paternity are now more trustworthy than in the
past, there is less need to rely on a presumption when paternity can be established by
other means. See note 12, supra. Even when these new procedures are available, in
some situations they may be of little value (for example, when the issue of paternity
arises long after the death of the alleged parents). Since scientific tests will not resolve
the question of paternity in many cases, the utility of a legal presumption remains
substantial.
23. Ogea v. Ogea, No. 7201 (La. App. 3d Cir. Oct. 10, 1979); Boudreaux v. Matt,
370 So. 2d 139 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979); Circello v. Circello, 369 So. 2d 722 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1979); Thompson v. Thompson, 367 So. 2d 1324 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979); Dufrene v.
Dufrene, 366 So. 2d 1016 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
24. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 27 & 178-83.
25. See note 5, supra, and accompanying text.
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tempt to shield children from the deprivations associated with il-
legitimacy whenever possible."
The policy favoring legitimate status is also evidenced by the
courts' application of the putative marriage doctrine. This doctrine
is based upon provisions of the Civil Code requiring that the civil ef-
fects of marriage flow to the child of the union even though the mar-
riage is null, so long as one party is in good faith.27 One civil effect of
marriage, as construed by the courts, is the legitimacy of the
children born during the union.28 The presumption of good faith'
reflects the belief that it is inappropriate to penalize the child for a
parental error when at least one parent has made an honest effort
to insure the child's legitimacy through marriage. The heavy burden
of proof required by the courts to establish bad faith helps to ensure
that the children of such marriages will be protected from il-
legitimacy."
Concern for the innocent offspring of illicit unions has, in part,
motivated the United States Supreme Court to strive to protect
such children from the harsh effects of illegitimacy. Several recent
cases3 ' support the proposition that equal protection is denied to il-
legitimates who suffer deprivation solely because of their status.2
26. See, e.g., Succession of Robins, 349 So. 2d 276 (La. 1977); Succession of Mit-
chell, 323 So. 2d 451 (La. 1975); Warren v. Richard, 296 So. 2d 813 (La. 1974).
27. This doctrine consists of a large body of jurisprudence construing Civil Code
articles 117 and 118.
28. See, e.g., Gathright v. Smith, 368 So. 2d 679 (La. 1979); Melancon v. Sonnier,
245 La. 150, 157 So. 2d 577 (1963); Succession of Marinoni, 183 La. 776, 164 So. 797
(1935); Succession of Buissiere, 41 La. Ann. 217, 5 So. 688 (1889); Succession of Fusilier,
325 So. 2d 296 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976).
29. See cases 'cited in note 28, supra.
30. The courts presume good faith unless the party alleging bad faith proves it af-
firmatively; thus, in cases of doubt, the issue in resolved in favor of the existence of
good faith. See, e.g., Gathright v. Smith, 368 So. 2d 679 (La. 1979); Melancon v. Son-
nier, 245 La. 150, 157 So. 2d 577 (1963); Lands v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of
United States, 239 La. 782, 120 So. 2d 74 (1960); Prince v. Hopson, 230 La. 575, 89 So.
2d 128 (1956); Succession of Fusilier, 325 So. 2d 296 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976).
31. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977);
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Glona v. American Guar. & Liab.
Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
32. The Louisiana Supreme Court has also been active in this area. See, e.g., Suc-
cession of Thompson, 367 So. 2d 796 (La. 1979); Succession of Robins, 349 So. 2d 276
(La. 1977). Article I, section 3 of the Louisiana constitution provides even greater pro-
tection to illegitimates than the federal equal protection clause since it specifically pro-
hibits arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable discrimination against a person because of
birth. The court in Succession of Thompson, 367 So. 2d 796 (La. 1979), made it clear
that this provision of the Louisiana constitution was designed to protect illegitimates
against unreasonable discrimination. Id. at 797.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has not yet resolved whether the intestacy provi-
sions in the Civil Code unreasonably discriminate against illegitimates. However, the
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The Court seems particularly concerned with the injustice of making
the child bear the burden of illegitimacy since he is not responsible
for the circumstances surrounding his birth. As the Court stated in
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 3
[v]isiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical
and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the illegitimate
child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal
burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibili-
ty or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth
and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual-as well as
an unjust-way of deterring the parent. 4
Equal protection provides a means for the Court to shield a child
from the harsh effects of illegitimacy once that classification has
been assigned. As discussed earlier,3 5 Louisiana jurisprudence
reflects the court's efforts to protect children from the disadvan-
tages of illegitimacy by avoiding the classification. Although the
approach of the two courts differs, both methods evidence a strong
policy in which the protection of innocent children is of prime impor-
tance.
second circuit has recently ruled that this is the case with respect to acknowledged il-
legitimates who are precluded from inheriting intestate from their father because of
the presence of legitimate heirs. Succession of Brown, No. 14,034 (La. App. 2d Cir. Jan.
22, 1980). The court held article 919 unconstitutional under both the federal Constitu-
tion, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, and the Louisiana constitution, LA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
The court stated that the state's interest in the preservation of stable land titles and
the orderly disposition of property at death was not substantially served by
discriminating against acknowledged illegitimates. Slip op. at 11. Since the paternity of
the acknowledged illegitimates was not in dispute, their virtual exclusion from the
father's succession was not necessary to prevent spurious claims. The decision draws
heavily from the rationale of Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978), and TDimble v. Gordon,
430 U.S. 762 (1977), both of which indicate that difficulty in proving paternity is not
sufficient justification for barring all illegitimates from inheriting. The Supreme Court
in Trimble stressed that a state can formulate a system for protecting the stability of
land titles which does not unnecessarily trample the constitutional rights of an il-
legitimate child. Id. at 770-71. The court in Brown found this logic persuasive and
noted that article 919 was an impermissible means of reaching the state's goal because
it excluded "each and every acknowledged illegitimate child who happens to have the
statistically probable misfortune of having his natural father survived by any
legitimate descendant, any ascendant, any collateral relation, or a wife." Slip op. at 7.
For a thorough discussion of the constitutional implications of the succession rights
of illegitimates, see Lorie, Succession Rights of Ilegitimates in Louisiana, 24 LoY. L.
REv. 1 (1978); Comment, Can Louisiana's Succession Laws Survive in Light of the
Supreme Court's Recent Recognition of Illegitimates' Rights?, 39 LA. L. REV. 1132
(1979).
33. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
34. Id. at 175.
35. See text at note 24-26, supra.
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In Tenneco Oil Co. v. Houston," the right of the Harps to the
royalties in question principally depended upon their classification
as the legitimate children of their mother. The mother, Lula Mae,
married Granderson King in 1926, and one child was born of that
union the next year. King left shortly thereafter, never to return.
There was no evidence of judicial separation or divorce; thus, the
marriage remained undissolved until King's death in 1974. The Harp
children were born to Lula Mae between 1937 and 1952 as a result
of her cohabitation with Ellis Harp. Lula Mae and Ellis Harp were
married in 1957. When the court of appeal concluded that the Harps
had only more ancient title under a common author, it impliedly
recognized the Harps as the mother's legitimate children.37 The
supreme court, citing only one case, 8 concluded that the Harps were
illegitimate. Offering little elaboration on the rationale supporting
this conclusion, the court simply stated that the mother's undis-
solved marriage to King made the children illegitimate.
Since prior jurisprudence 9 has been very sympathetic to claims
of legitimacy, the court's approach in the instant case seems quite
incongruous. To conclude that the children were illegitimate, the
court must have reasoned that they were in fact Harp's issue, but
had resulted from a liaison which occurred while the mother was
married to another, thus making the children the offspring of an
adulterous connection. While the court's conclusion seems to be
based on a logical perception of the facts, it is somewhat at odds
with the presumption of paternity in article 184 and the cases con-
struing that provision. Since the mother's marriage to King was
undissolved and King had never disavowed the children,'" the Harps
should be presumed to be the legitimate children of King.
36. 372 So. 2d 1194 (La. 1979).
37. Under Civil Code article 918 the Harps would not be entitled to inherit from
their mother if she had died intestate and they were considered illegitimate. Article
918 provides that illegitimate acknowledged children are excluded from their mother's
succession when she dies leaving a legitimate descendant, which was the factual situa-
tion presented.
38. Succession of Robins, 349 So. 2d 276 (La. 1977).
39. See notes 17 & 23, supra.
40. As a result of King's failure to disavow the Harps during his lifetime, the suit
could only be brought by his-heirs. Concern over the retroactivity of the 1976 revision
of the paternity articles is unnecessary. It appears that the action had already
prescribed under either article. See note 16, supra. The facts indicate that King had
only one heir and no legatees. This heir was the child who was born in 1927 of King's
union with Lula Mae. Prior to the 1976 revision, the heirs were required to bring suit
within six months after the time they were disturbed in their possession of the hus-
band's estate. LA. CIv. CODE art. 192 (as it appeared prior to 1976 La. Acts, No. 430).
The record contains no mention of a disavowal action being brought within the six
month period following the initiation of the concursus proceeding, which appears to be
1980] 1031
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It is particularly puzzling that the court cited Succession of
Robins 1 to support its holding. In Robins the court held that Civil
Code article 1488 was unconstitutional because it deprived
adulterous bastards of the rights that other illegitimates have to in-
herit by testamentary disposition. Obviously, the issue in Robins is
far removed from that in Tenneco. In addition, although it is dictum,
there is specific language in Robins which explains that children
born of the union of an unmarried man and a married woman are
protected from the label "adulterous bastards" by the presumption
of paternity found in Civil Code article 184.2 It is difficult to com-
prehend how Robins can be used to support the proposition that the
Harps should not inherit.
With the exception of one footnote, the opinion provides no
reasons why the court considered the Harps to be illegitimate. In that
note, the court stated, "Regardless of whether the Harp claimants are
considered to be the children of King (their mother's husband), they
are illegitimate adulterous children of Lula Mae . ... ."' If, as the court
suggests, King is considered the father of the children, his paternity
could only be based on the presumption in article 184. Indeed, in this
fact situation it would be hard to suspect King of any kind of paterni-
ty other than legal paternity. It is difficult to understand how the
children could be considered the illegitimate issue of a married
woman if her husband's paternity is presumed because of his mar-
riage to her.
Assuming the presumption of paternity did apply, the Harps
would be placed in the same position as children who had been
disavowed by their mother's husband. Although the Code has
always restricted this right to the husband," it has been suggested
that the court has more than once arrived at holdings which seem to
create a right of disavowal in other parties.'" This theory could
serve as an explanation for the court's finding of illegitimacy in Ten-
neco. There is a distinction, however, between Tenneco and other
cases which have allowed disavowal in this manner, such as Succes-
sion of Mitchell" and Warren v. Richard." In these latter cases, the
the first disturbance. Under the 1976 revision, the longest possible period for bringing
the action was one year after King's death in 1974. LA. CIV. CODE art. 190, as amended
by 1976 La. Acts, No. 430. Any right on the part of the heir to disavow King's paterni-
ty expired in 1975, several years before the instant suit. Therefore, the presumption of
paternity, as it applied to King, was conclusive.
41. 349 So. 2d 276 (La. 1977).
42. Id. at 280.
43. 372 So. 2d at 1195-96 n.2.
44. See notes 13-15, supra, and accompanying text.
45. Spaht & Shaw, supra note 6, at 78-79.
46. 323 So. 2d 451 (La. 1975).
47. 296 So. 2d 813 (La. 1974).
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court went beyond the provisions of the Code to ensure that the
children would not be denied benefits from their biological father
merely because they were not considered his legitimate children.
The effect of the court's action in Tenneco is to deny the children
benefits from either possible father and, more importantly, from
their mother.
The court's conclusion is consistent with the theory that the
presumption of paternity during marriage only applies when the
children are recognized through reputation or registry as the off-
spring of the mother's husband."8 Based upon this theory, the
presumption would not apply to King, since the children were raised
by Harp, bore his name, and had never seen King.49 This analysis
provides a possible explanation for the result in Tenneco; however,
the theory has enjoyed so little recognition by the courts that it
seems improbable that the court would employ it without explana-
tion. If the court did adopt the construction which requires that the
children be recognized as the husband's by reputation or registry,"°
such a change deserves comment. It seems more likely, however,
that the court relied on the unproven biological fact that Harp had
fathered the children.
A finding that the Harps are legitimate might not be precluded
even though the presumption of paternity is inapplicable. When
Lula Mae married Harp in 1957, she stated that she was divorced. 1
There is no evidence that Harp was in bad faith;52 thus, by applica-
tion of the putative marriage doctrine, the Harps could be con-
sidered legitimated by the subsequent marriage of their parents.
But the court does not even allude to the possible application of this
doctrine. Considering the expansive jurisprudential policy which
favors legitimacy," the court should have at least explored the
possibility of legitimation resulting from the marriage of Lula Mae
48. Professor Pascal contends that this construction of the Code would provide a
more effective means of having legal and biological paternity coincide. See R. PASCAL,
Louisiana Family Law Course § 12.6 (1973). Accord, Spaht & Shaw, supra note 6, at
84-85.
49. 372 So. 2d at 1195.
50. See note 48, supra.
51. Brief for Appellant, Tenneco Oil Co. v. Houston, 372 So. 2d 1194 (La. 1979).
52. The courts have been willing to sustain a finding of good faith merely because
of a lack of probative evidence of bad faith. See note 30, supra, and accompanying text.
In situations in which one spouse claims a prior marriage was dissolved by divorce, the
court has held the other spouse to a duty of inquiry only when other circumstances
should arouse his suspicions. See Gathright v. Smith, 368 So. 2d 679 (La. 1979). For ex-
amples of facts which should put a putative spouse on notice, see Prieto v. Succession
of Prieto, 165 La. 710, 115 So. 911 (1928); Succession of Thomas, 144 La. 25, 80 So. 186
(1918); Succession of Taylor, 39 La. Ann. 823, 2 So. 581 (1887).
53. See notes 27-30, supra, and accompanying text.
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and Harp. Since the facts indicate good faith on the part of Harp,
the putative marriage doctrine would have applied to protect the
children from illegitimacy regardless of their mother's bad faith. 4
Furthermore, the jurisprudential construction of article 118 allows
the civil effects to flow to the children from both parents, including
the parent in bad faith. Therefore, the Harps could be considered
their mother's legitimate issue and could inherit from her. Had the
court pursued this theory, it is conceivable that the Harps could
have been found to be the legitimate issue of their biological
parents.5 This result would satisfy the jurisprudential preference
for having legal and biological parenthood coincide, while protecting
the Harps' rights of inheritance, all within the confines of a process
established by the Code. Such a potentially desirable result certain-
ly should have justified the effort of investigation.
Even a finding of illegitimacy might not prevent the Harps from
inheriting in light of the recent equal protection decisions." In any
equal protection case, it must be shown that the disadvantaged class
is similarly situated with a privileged class so that discrimination
arises out of the classification and not from a difference in cir-
cumstance. Whereas a traditional justification for restricting the
rights of illegitimates to inherit intestate has been the difficulty of
proving paternity, 7 the court in Tenneco was not faced with this
problem, since the Harps sought to inherit from their mother, whose
maternity was never in dispute. Moreover, the United States
Supreme Court has stressed that the familial bonds between the il-
legitimate child and his parent are often as great as those of the
legitimate child. This was certainly true of the Harps; they were
reared by their mother while her legitimate child was not.5"
The absence of a well-articulated rationale makes an assessment
of the significance of Tenneco unusually difficult. The decision seem-
54. See Succession of Marinoni, 183 La. 776, 164 So. 797 (1935).
55. Professor Pascal states that one possible construction of Civil Code article 117
would allow children born of an illicit union to reap the civil effects of a subsequent
marriage of their parents, even though that marriage is null. R. PASCAL, supra note 48,
at § 4.16.
56. See cases cited in note 31, supra.
57. See, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762
(1977); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971). See also Comment, supra note 32, at
1138-39.
58. The mother's legitimate child born of the union with King lived with, and was
reared by, her maternal grandparents. The Harps lived with Lula Mae and Harp dur-
ing their minority.
The rationale of Succession of Brown, No. 14,034 (La. App. 2d Cir. Jan. 22, 1980), if
applied to the facts of Tenneco, gives rise to a strong inference that the Harps' il-
legitimate status would not bar their inheritance. See note 32, supra.
1034 [Vol. 40
NOTES
ingly provides an alternative to the provisions on filiation and
classification in the Code, but the lack of explanation for this change
gives rise to some disturbing implications. The process for
establishing familial relations provided for by the Code has not been
without problems in its utilization,59 but it-is at least a well-defined
procedure which produces predictable results. This consistency in
establishing familial ties does more than promote stable relations.
The conclusiveness of legitimate filiation 0 has also been the basis
for certainty in the disposition of property, a consideration which is
especially important in a system of forced heirship." Tenneco sug-
gests that other means for determining filiation are now available,
but it does not define what those alternatives are. This lack of cer-
tainty could easily lead to many inconsistent and perhaps unjust
results.
The decision in Tenneco may not prove to be of lasting
significance, for it cannot be cited as absolute authority for any legal
principle. While reaching a conclusion that is in obvious conflict with
the result dictated by the Civil Code, the court offers no theoretical
basis for circumvention of the pertinent codal provisions. In addi-
tion, Tenneco departs from the longstanding jurisprudential policy
underlying the filiation and classification process, which should
further limit its usefulness as authority. Tenneco is an unfortunate
example of the haphazard results which can occur when established
legal principles are cast aside. Return to the coherent system for
establishing filiation provided by the Civil Code is essential to the
stability and predictability of an area of the law that is in the pro-
cess of radical change, constitutionally mandated.
Helen Scott Johnson
59. See notes 18-23, supra, and accompanying text.
60. See notes 16-21, supra, and accompanying text.
61. See notes 32 & 57, supra, and accompanying text. The courts have accorded
great weight to the importance of the state's interest in establishing an orderly system
for the disposition of property.
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